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Abstract—Bitcoin, as well as many of its successors, require the
whole transaction record to be reliably acquired by all nodes to
prevent double-spending. Recently, many blockchains have been
proposed to achieve scale-out throughput by letting nodes only
acquire a fraction of the whole transaction set. However, these
schemes, e.g., sharding and off-chain techniques, suffer from a
degradation in decentralization or the capacity of fault tolerance.
In this paper, we show that the complete set of transactions
is not a necessity for the prevention of double-spending if
the properties of value transfers is fully explored. In other
words, we show that a value-transfer ledger like Bitcoin has the
potential to scale-out by its nature without sacrificing security
or decentralization. Firstly, we give a formal definition for the
value-transfer ledger and its distinct features from a generic
database. Then, we introduce an off-chain based scheme with
a shared main chain for consensus and an individual chain
for each node for recording transactions. A locally executable
validation scheme is proposed with uncompromising validity
and consistency. A beneficial consequence of our design is that
nodes will spontaneously try to reduce their transmission cost
by only providing the transactions needed to show that their
transactions are double-spending-proof. As a result, the network
is sharded as each node only acquires part of the transaction
record and a scale-out throughput could be achieved, which we
call “spontaneous sharding”.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain technology, made popular by Bitcoin [1], can
be described as an append-only database maintained by
distributed nodes instead of central authorities. One of the
most well-known applications of blockchain technology is
cryptocurrency, in which the blockchain is in the form of
a distributed ledger, i.e., the data is transactions which are
records of value transfers, called transactions, between nodes.
The most crucial part of a distributed ledger for value transfer
is the prevention of double-spending, which is achieved by
consensus algorithms that guarantee all honest nodes in the
network keep a consistent ledger of all valid transactions. The
consensus algorithm can be divided into two categories, the
Nakamoto-like consensus algorithms such as Proof-of-Work
(POW) [1] or Proof-of-Stake (POS) [2], [3] and Byzantine
fault tolerance (BFT) consensus algorithms such as PBFT [4].
For distributed ledger type of blockchain, most of the consen-
sus algorithms effectively achieve the following conditions.
• Agreement (Consistency): Two honest nodes should not
have disagreement on the validity of a transaction.
• Validity (Correctness): Invalid transactions cannot be
validated by honest nodes.
• Termination (Liveness): All transactions will be even-
tually known by all honest nodes.
Strictly speaking, the above conditions are not achievable
in asynchronous networks [5], [6]. However, by slightly com-
promising either asynchronous [4] or deterministic conditions
for termination [7], [8], the above-mentioned conditions can
be achieved in practical asynchronous network. Blockchains
with both Nakamoto-like consensus [9] and BFT consensus
can have scalable throughput, i.e., the communication cost
per transaction (CCPT) is restricted to O(N), where N is the
number of nodes in the network. Various consensus algorithms
could achieve consensus with O(N) complexity.
• Improved BFT algorithms: Traditional BFT algorithms
like [4], [7], [8] have O(N2) CCPT. However, many
recent BFT algorithms like [10], [11], [12], [13] achieve
O(N) CCPT by either packing up transactions or oppor-
tunistically running a much simpler scheme with tradi-
tional schemes as the back-up for the worst scenario.
• Nakamoto-like consensus: The POW scheme in Bitcoin
introduced a game theoretical aspect to this problem.
Then, instead of restricting the number of faulty nodes,
an assumption is put on the rationality of nodes in
the network. However, some early POW or POS based
schemes have limitation in the transaction rate to meet the
synchronous requirements [14]. With this problem solved
in novel algorithms like [3], [15], [16], [17], O(N) CCPT
is feasible in Nakamoto-like consensus.
A. Scalability of Blockchain
The most crucial problem in a decentralized value-transfer
system is double-spending, which could be prevented when
all nodes have a consistent record of all transactions. Then,
O(N) CCPT is required for all transactions. Blockchains with
O(N) CCPT are commonly referred as “scalable” blockchains
since their throughput will not decrease (or increase) with
the number of nodes and the computation and communication
capacities in the network.
1) Scale-out Blockchain Solutions: Recently, several solu-
tions have been proposed to achieve o(N) CCPT, sometimes
referred as “scale-out” throughput as the throughput will
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increase as N grows, by reducing the number of validators
and recordkeepers for each transaction. In other words, the
termination property is compromised, i.e., a transaction is not
necessarily known to or validated by the whole network, but
a part of it. Here, we introduce three types of such schemes.
• Off-chain Solutions: This type of approach are mostly
associated with some existing blockchain systems as the
main chain. Each node holds their transactions locally,
sometimes referred as “off-chain”, and only sends a
description or the eventual outcome of these transactions
to the “main chain”, referred as “on-chain”. Since there
is no guarantee on the validity of the “off-chain” trans-
actions, either validation nodes are introduced to validate
and endorse these transactions [18], [19] or economical
deposit should be provided for the transactions [20], [21].
In both cases, the validity condition is compromised due
to centralization or the economical constraint.
• Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) Solutions: In another
type of approach, we call DAG solutions, the transac-
tions are not structured in a chain, but in a DAG [22],
[23], [24]. The validity is dependent on the (directly
or indirectly) outgoing edges of the transaction, which
represents the nodes that have validated it. A scale-out
throughput can be achieved if the acquirement of the
complete graph is not obligated for all nodes 1. Then,
the validity of the transactions is compromised due to its
dependency on the validators.
• Sharding Solutions: Recently, sharding solutions, which
artificially divide the network, have been widely studied
and discussed [25], [26], [27], [28]. They include schemes
that fairly and randomly divide the network into small
shards with vanishing probability of any shard having an
overwhelming number of adversaries. Hence, the BFT
consensus algorithm is run only within the shards and the
CCPT is then O(g2) (O(g) if scalable BFT algorithms
are used) where g is the size of the shard. However,
the validity condition is also compromised in the sense
that the sharding is only feasible when the ratio of
adversaries in the network is small. Moreover, according
to our knowledge none of the existing sharding schemes
proved g = o(N), which is the condition for scale-out
throughput.
2) Problem Statement: It seems to be infeasible to achieve
scale-out performance with the same level of security or
decentralization as Bitcoin or blockchains using classical BFT
algorithms. This does not come as a surprise since intuitively,
double-spending can only be prevented with global consensus.
This problem severely hampers the mainstream adoption of
blockchain system since the security and trustworthiness of the
blockchain system grows with the size of the network and the
decentralization level. As a result, a trilemma is formed among
throughput, security, and decentralization as also stated in [25],
1In fact, in [22], [23], [24], the complete graph is required to prevent
double-spending for their applications. Hence, they are not scale-out schemes,
although a DAG scheme designed similarly could scale-out for some other
applications.
[27]. However, at the meantime, traditional BFT algorithms
could reach consensus on any type of message, which is redun-
dant for many blockchain systems since messages in Bitcoin
and cryptocurrencies are “transactions” which represent value
transfers.
This leads to the research questions considered by this
paper:
• What is the key functionality/features of the value-
transfer blockchains?
• Can we use these features to design a scale-out
blockchain system to achieve the functionalities of value
transfer without sacrificing reliability or decentralization?
B. Overview of Our Solution
Our solution gives an answer to the above questions. By
exploring the features of value transfers which have not
yet been used by other blockchain systems, we propose a
blockchain system with a very simple structure to achieve
scale-out throughput.
1) Value-Transfer Ledgers: Most of the aforementioned
blockchain systems are decentralized solutions for value trans-
fers and focus on reaching BFT consensus on transactions to
prevent double-spending. However, traditional BFT consensus
algorithms are generic and achieve BFT consensus regard-
less of the message type. In Bitcoin and other blockchain
systems using Nakamoto-like consensus [9], some realistic
interpretation of transactions is used and the notion of rational
behavior is introduced: rational issuers of transactions are
interested in proving the validity of their transactions and
keeping synchronized with other nodes. As a result, they either
take effort themselves by mining or hire other nodes by paying
transaction fee to submit their transactions to a blockchain
which reaches BFT consensus. In this paper, we take one step
further to formally define the features for value transfers in
the Value-Transfer Ledgers (VTL) model, i.e.,
• rational senders of the transactions should take effort to
prove the authenticity of the transaction to the receiver;
• rational receivers should check the authenticity of a
transaction while receiving it;
• a rational receiver will not care about the authenticity of
other transactions unless they have an impact on their
received transactions.
With these features, we propose a system that minimizes the
redundancy of reaching BFT consensus on the transactions as
if they are generic data and allows secure and reliable value
transfers in a full decentralized fashion.
2) Our System: Our system has an off-chain structure,
which contains individual chains for nodes to record their own
transactions and a main chain for the consensus of the abstracts
of their chains, i.e., provides a shared global state. Further,
a locally executable validation function is proposed to have
correct and consistent validation results upon all transactions.
Besides a validation function, the crucial part of a valid
validation scheme is that all honest nodes should also have
a consistent observation of the transactions. In our system,
we employ the aforementioned features of value transfers
to achieved an alternation: instead of letting all nodes have
consistent observation on all transactions, we guarantee that
all nodes that want to know the validity of a transactions
will have consistent observation on all transactions that have
impact on the validity of that transaction. We also prove that
this alternation is enough to have a valid system for value
transfers.
3) Spontaneous Sharding: Moreover, the most innovative
result in this paper is spontaneous sharding, which is a natural
and direct consequence of using our system for value transfers.
Generally speaking, in value-transfer systems, the values are
passed from one node to another. In our system, for each piece
of value, a proof is associated with it and the size of the proof
grows with the number of nodes that it has been passed to.
Then, since the sender could choose the source of his fund for
the transactions, e.g., in Bitcoin, a node could choose from
several of his unspent transaction outputs, rational nodes will
choose the pieces of value with the minimum size of proof for
the sake of the transmission cost. As a result, nodes will tend to
cycle the value in small shards rather than the whole network.
In other words, the network is sharded by the nature of the
system without sacrificing either security or decentralization.
C. Main Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are the following.
• We formally define the VTL and distinguish it from other
types of ledgers and databases.2
• We propose an off-chain based blockchain system that
prevents double-spending without sacrificing either secu-
rity or decentralization. In particular, our consensus al-
gorithm achieves uncompromised agreement and validity
conditions of the BFT consensus in VTL model.
• We prove that our system is a valid VTL system. In
other words, although our system do not guarantee BFT
for generic types of data, we guarantee that if all nodes
have interest in their values in the system and behave
rationally, the valid transactions in our system are double-
spending-proof.
• It is shown that the CCPT of our system is upper bounded
by O(N), which suggests scalable throughput. Moreover,
we show that our system could achieve scale-out through-
put via spontaneous sharding in several scenarios.
D. Content of This Paper
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
formally introduce the VTL model and assumptions. In Sec-
tion III, we introduce our system and prove the correctness
of this system in VTL model. We analyze the performance
of our scheme and introduce the concept of spontaneous
sharding which results in scale-out throughput in Section IV.
In Section V, we conclude our paper with possible topics for
further exploration.
2A slightly similar idea have been raised in [29] without a formal defined
model or details for feasible schemes.
II. MODEL
In this paper, we emphasize on our novelties and contri-
butions by showing that our system provides the minimum
functionalities for value transfers. These functionalities can be
used as building blocks for more generic VTL systems. Hence,
some other elements are simplified to the most comprehensive
level, e.g.,
• We consider every node holding some initial value. The
mining of new coins is not considered.
• Transactions are defined similarly to Bitcoin, namely the
Unspent Transaction Output as input (UTXO) structure.
We assume a transaction has only one sender and one
receiver.
• We consider a weak asynchronous network with f ≤
bN−13 c Byzantine adversaries, just as the one used in [4],
so that PBFT can be straightforwardly applied. Note that
this assumption is solely made for easy comprehension of
our system. The same framework proposed in our system
can be plugged into any permissioned or permissionless
blockchain or consensus algorithm that achieves global
BFT consensus on all transactions.
• We assume that there exists an unbreakable hash function
Y = H(X) and a digital signature scheme Y = Sigi(X)
based on the public-private key pairs where node i is the
signer.
A. Network Model
We consider a weak asynchronous network of N nodes
in which the message delay does not increase indefinitely
as described in [4]. Each node holds some initial value that
could be transacted with others. We assume that there are
f ≤ bN−13 c Byzantine adversaries and we have the following
definitions for honest nodes and adversaries.
Definition 1 (Honest nodes and Adversaries). Honest nodes
will follow the schemes of the system. Adversaries can behave
arbitrarily.
The network is assumed to be permissioned, i.e., the nodes
are known to each other by their identities n ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N}.
We also assume that there exists a public key infrastructure
(PKI) and nodes can link between the identity and the public
key of each node. Moreover, we introduce the “chain” as a
data structure that consists of an ordered sequence of blocks.
Each block consists of multiple transactions and a hash digest
of the previous block, except for the first block, namely the
genesis block.
B. VTL Model
Inspired by Bitcoin, most of the blockchain systems mimic
value transfer systems, e.g., currency, in a decentralized fash-
ion. The problem could be described as the following: Each
node holds some positive value that they could transfer to
others via transactions. A transaction is only valid if it is
authorized by the owner of the value and the value cannot be
double-spent. In other words, for any “value” in the network,
it has three properties:
1) Ownership: Value has an owner. Only the owner of the
value can authorize to transfer his value.
2) Fluidity: Any transfer can be completed in finite time.
3) Validity: The value cannot be created or duplicated.
A value transfer system can be in many forms, e.g., the
account-based ledgers, which is widely used in banking system
and many other accounting systems. Bitcoin, as well as many
other blockchain systems, use a ledger with UTXO structure,
which is very suitable for decentralized systems. Here, we
introduce the UTXO structure.
1) UTXO: Firstly, in UTXO a transaction is an authorized
piece of information that transfers the value from one node
to another. In this paper, we use the following definition for a
transaction, which is a slight variation of the traditional UTXO
structure used in Bitcoin.
Definition 2 (Transaction). A transaction txi is a five-tuple:
txi = 〈Sourcei, si, di, ai, ri〉 where Sourcei is the set of
transactions which are used as the source, si is the sender,
di is the receiver, ai is the transacted value, and ri is the
remaining value.
In Bitcoin, transactions are usually referred to the ones
on the longest chain, which also suggest that they are valid
transactions. However, in some other systems like [30], [31],
the concept of a valid transaction is ambiguous since invalid
transactions can also exist on the chain. As a result, a deter-
ministic and consistent rule should be applied for all nodes
to determine the valid transactions. Here, we define the valid
transaction in UTXO as the following.
Definition 3 (Validity of a Transaction). A transaction txi =
〈Sourcei, si, di, ai, ri〉 is valid if and only if the following
conditions hold.
• Confirmed and authorized: txi, as well as some witness
indicating that txi is authorized by si, e.g., a digital
signature of txi signed by si, are on a tamper-proof
ledger.
• Valid sources: All transactions in txj ∈ Sourcei are
valid.
• Value equality: The original value equals to the sum
of the transacted value and the remaining value, i.e.,∑
txj∈Sourcei rj = ai + ri.
• No double-spending: Assuming txi = tu,k,l, for any
txj ∈ Sourcei, there does not exist a valid transaction
txi′ = tu,k′,l′ , txj ∈ Sourcei′ such that k′ < k or k =
k, l′ < l.
Then, we define the unspent transaction in UTXO.
Definition 4 (Unspent Transaction). A transaction txi is an
unspent transaction if there is no other transaction txj in the
ledger which is valid and txi ∈ Sourcej .
Clearly, in UTXO structure, the value exists in the form
of unspent transactions. The value is always transferred from
one unspent transaction to another unspent transaction, instead
of transferring from one account to another account as the
account-based ledger structure.
2) Properties of VTL Model: Traditional blockchain sys-
tems prevent double-spending by reaching the classical BFT
consensus on all transactions. The most straightforward ap-
proach is to treat transactions as bit strings and use classical
BFT algorithms [4], [7], [8] or improved BFT algorithms [10],
[11], [13] to reach consensus. However, this approach misses
the notion of “value” behind the transactions and discards
the differences between a transaction and general data. These
differences will be uncovered if the original notion of value is
focused. Here, we pick up the idea behind the “rational nodes”
and “transaction” notions in Nakamoto-like consensus and add
more real-world interpretations to these two notions in value
transfers.
Firstly, value has an owner and the receiver of an unspent
transaction is the owner of that value until it is spent again. The
owner would take full initiative and responsibility of proving
the existence and the authenticity of the value to any node upon
request. If he fails to do so, it will be considered as against his
own interest. For instance, if the value is considered as money,
the holder of the money is motivated to prove the money is
real when he uses it for purchase. A failure in proving will
cause the purchase to fail, which is against his own interest.
Secondly, the concern of the nodes is the authenticity of the
value they owned instead of the transaction records. Hence,
nodes will check the past transaction records only if the
records have impact on the authenticity of the value that they
concern. Otherwise, nodes have no interest and will not care
about the validity of a past transaction.
As a result, we make three assumptions in VTL model.
Throughout this paper, we use the term “node u is curious
about transaction txi” to represent that node would like to
check the validity of transaction txi.
Assumption 1 (History Disinterest). A node u is curious about
a spent transaction txi only when it is curious about an unspent
transaction txj and the validity of txi is required to check the
validity of txj .
Assumption 2 (Rational Receiving). A node u is curious
about transaction txi if it is the receiver of txi and does not
know the validity of it.
Assumption 3 (Rational Owner). If node u is the receiver of
a valid and unspent transaction txi, it will provide the validity
proof of txi to any node once it is requested.
In practice, it is not rational for a node to validate an
unspent transaction if it is not the receiver since validation
is resource consuming. Hence, we have an alternative version
for Assumption 2 to minimize the cost in a resource-limited
network.
Assumption 4 (Rational and Cost-saving Receiving). A node
u is curious about transaction txi if and only if it is the
receiver of txi and does not know the validity of it.
This assumption will not affect the correctness of our
scheme. It will be applied in the performance analysis for
simplicity.
3) Valid VTL System: Then, we define a valid VTL system
with a structure of UTXO.
Definition 5 (Valid VTL System). A system with UTXO
structure is called a valid VTL system if it satisfies the
following conditions under Assumption 1-3:
1) Ownership: If an honest node receives a valid transac-
tion, then he can make one valid transaction using it as
a source. Meanwhile, no other node can make a valid
transaction using it as a source.
2) Fluidity: A valid transaction will be considered as valid
by the receiver in finite time if both the sender and the
receiver are honest.
3) Validity: Invalid transactions will not be considered as
valid by honest nodes.
Remark 1 (Relationship Between BFT Consensus and Valid
VTL System). Clearly, the Validity condition of valid VTL
systems is exactly the Validity condition in the BFT consensus.
Then, the Fluidity condition is guaranteed by all three BFT
consensus conditions and the Ownership condition is guar-
anteed by the Agreement condition and the way that UTXO
structure is designed. Hence, BFT consensus on the transac-
tions is a sufficient condition for a valid VTL system. However,
later we will show that it is not a necessary condition for
VTL since the BFT consensus with a weakened Termination
condition is also sufficient for a valid VTL system.
III. OUR SYSTEM
Our system consists of three parts: individual chains for
transactions, a main chain for a global shared state, and a
validation scheme for validation of the transactions. In this
section, we first introduce these three parts of our system and
give important theorems of the system. Then, we prove that
our system is a valid VTL system as well as prove that our
system actually only compromises the Termination condition
of the BFT consensus.
A. Individual Chains
Each node generates an individual chain to record their own
transactions in a first-in-first-out fashion. An individual chain
of node u is an ordered set of blocks {Bu,1,Bu,2, . . . , } and a
block is an ordered set Bu,k = {H(Bu,k−1), tu,k,1, tu,k,2, . . .},
where tu,k,l is a transaction sent by node u with valid
sources, value equality, and no double-spending as defined
in Definition 3. In our system, we assume that there is an
initial value assigned to each node in the same fashion as a
transaction with no source. The sender and receiver of this
transaction are both the node itself.
The size of a block can be arbitrary. Periodically, nodes
send Abstracts to the main chain (will be introduced in the
next paragraph). The abstract is defined as the following.
Definition 6 (Abstract). An abstract of block
Bu,k, denoted by Au,k, is a four-tuple: Au,k =
〈u, k,H(Bu,k),Sigu(u||k||H(Bu,k))〉.
B. Main Chain
The main chain uses PBFT as its consensus algorithm and
the blocks consist of Abstracts signed by the corresponding
nodes. We assume that the abstracts of all genesis blocks are
on the main chain. Since it has been proved that the PBFT
can reach BFT consensus on messages in our network model
[4], we simply see the main chain as a reliable and secure
primitive and all abstracts included on the main chain reaching
the BFT consensus. Honest nodes will send abstracts of their
newest blocks to the main chain when they observe that their
previous abstracts are on-chain.
C. Confirmation
The transactions on individual chains are arbitrary in the
sense that they are neither tamper-proof nor signed. The
transactions will be tamper-proof and signed if an abstract
of a block that comes after it is contained in the main chain,
which we call confirmed transactions. Here, we give the formal
definitions of a confirmed transaction and a confirmed block.
Definition 7 (Confirmation). A block Bu,k is confirmed if
• an abstract of the block or a block after it, i.e., Au,k′ , k′ ≥
k, is on the main chain;
• for all abstracts of node u, denoted by Au,l, that are on
the main chain and l ≤ k′, Au,l is compliant to their
corresponding blocks.
A transaction txi = 〈Sourcei, si, di, ai, ri〉 is a confirmed
transaction if txi ∈ Bu,k, si = u, and Bu,k is confirmed.
We call Bu,k and txi are confirmed by Au,k′ .
The confirmation of a transaction suggests that it is tamper-
proof as if it is on-chain, which is shown in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1 (Confirmed Transactions). If txi = tu,k,l
is a transaction confirmed by abstract Au,k′ , k′ ≥ k,
then there does not exist a chain of confirmed blocks
{B′u,1,B′u,2, . . . ,B′u,k′} such that t′u,k,l 6= txi and all hashes
are correct.
The formal proof of this theorem is given in Appendix A.
By Theorem 1, when a transaction is confirmed, the position
and content of it cannot be changed. Furthermore, it is also
signed since the sender of the transaction is the same as the
signer of the abstract and the abstract contains an unforgeable
signature of the sender. Note that a confirmed transaction here
is not the same as confirmed transaction in other blockchain
systems like Bitcoin, as they are not yet validated.
D. Validation Scheme
Our validation scheme consists of two parts: a proof col-
lection process that allows any node that is curious about a
transaction to reliably and efficiently collect the proof of it;
a validation function that deterministically decide whether a
transaction is valid or not depending on the collected proof.
1) Proof Collection: First we define the validity proof of a
transaction txi.
Definition 8 (Validity Proof). Assuming that the sender si = u
for transaction txi, txi ∈ Bu,k, and there exists an abstract
Au,k′ , k
′ ≥ k in the main chain, a validity proof P(txi) is
the union of a set of all blocks before and including Bu,k′
and the proofs of all transactions in Sourcei, i.e., P(txi) =
{Bu,k′′ |k′′ ≤ k′} ∪ {Bv,l|Bv,l ∈ P(txj), txj ∈ Sourcei}.
By Definition 8, a validity proof of txi ∈ Bu,k includes the
chain of u from the genesis block to a block Bu,k′ , k′ ≥ k
which has an abstract in the main chain. Moreover, it also
includes the chains of the sources of this transaction, and
recursively the sources of the sources until the genesis block.
In the following lemma, we show that the proofs of valid
transactions can always be collected by nodes who are curious
about them in the VTL model.
Lemma 1 (Feasibility of the Proof Collection). If a node u
is curious about a valid transaction txi, then it can always
identify a node v such that it would provide the proof of txi.
Proof. If txi is an unspent transaction, this lemma directly
follows from Assumption 3 since the receiver of txi will
provide it. If txi is a spent transaction, then by Assumption 1,
u will only be curious about txi if u is curious about an
unspent transaction txj and the validity of txi is required for
the validity of txj . By Definition 8, we have P(txi) ⊂ P(txj).
Hence, by Assumption 3, u can collect the proof of txj from
the receiver of txj .
By Lemma 1, the proof of a transaction txi can always be
collected reliably and efficiently. By reliably, we mean that by
Lemma 1, the proof can always be collected in the VTL model
without any risk of disconnections. By efficiently, we mean
that the collection is a simple point-to-point communication
without the need of a reliable broadcast scheme like [8] to
tolerant malicious behaviors.
However, although by our model the receiver of an unspent
transaction is motivated to provide the correct proof, the
requester of the proof will not accept it as a proof without
his own verification. We give the Proof Verification Algorithm
Ver(P(txi)) in Algorithm 2 in Appendix B. If Ver(P(txi)) =
pass, it suggests that P(txi) is indeed a validity proof for
transaction txi since the algorithm is a direct translation from
the definition of the validity proof.
2) Validation Function: The deterministic Validation Func-
tion is given in Algorithm 1.
The correctness of the validation function is given in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2. V(txi,P(txi)) = valid if and only if txi is valid.
This theorem holds since the validation function is a
straightforward translation of the definition of the validity. The
detailed proof is given in Appendix C.
Algorithm 1 Validation Function V(txi,P(txi)), txi =
〈Sourcei, si, di, ai, ri〉 ∈ Bu,k
#Validity Proof Check
if Ver(P(txi)) 6= pass then return unknown
#Equality Check
if
∑
(all remaining values from Sourcei) 6= ai + ri then
return unknown
#Double-Spending Check
for Bu,m,m = [1 : k] do
for All transactions txj in Bu,m do
if Sourcej∩Sourcei 6= ∅ and txi 6= txj then return
unknown
#Source Check
for all transactions txj in Sourcei do
if V(txj ,P(txj)) 6= valid then return unknown
return valid
E. BFT Satisfactory
Here, we show that our system satisfies the agreement and
validity condition of BFT with a compromised termination
condition for all valid transactions.
Theorem 3 (BFT Satisfactory). Our system satisfies the
following conditions in VTL model. Here, we use the term
“node u validates a transaction txi” to represent that node u
runs a validation function on txi with the result valid.
• Agreement (Consistency): If an honest node validated a
transaction, then, if another honest node is curious about
this transaction, it will also validate it.
• Validity (Correctness): If a transaction can be validated
by an honest node, then at least one honest node that is
curious about it can validate it.
• Termination (Liveness): If a transaction is proposed by
an honest node, then it can be validated in finite time.
Proof.
• Agreement: If a transaction txi is validated by an honest
node, i.e., V(txi,P(txi)) = valid, then, by Theorem 2,
txi is valid. By Lemma 1, if another node is curious about
txi, the proof can be collected. Then, since the validation
function is deterministic, another curious honest node will
also run the validation function and the result will be
valid.
• Validity: Firstly, by Theorem 2, a validated transaction
is equivalent to a valid transaction. Then, by Lemma 1
its proof can be collected by an honest curious node and
by Theorem 2 it will be validated.
• Termination: If a transaction is proposed by an honest
node, by the definition of the honest node, it should have
valid sources, value equality, and no double-spending
as suggested in Subsection III-A. Then, by the BFT
satisfactory of the PBFT scheme we used for the main
chain, this transaction will eventually be confirmed and
meets all requirement of a valid transaction. Then, by
Theorem 2, it can be validated.
F. Validity of the System
Now we show that our system is a valid VTL system by
showing all three conditions in Definition 5 are guaranteed in
the VTL model.
Theorem 4 (Validity of Our System). A system described in
this section is a valid VTL system.
Proof.
• Ownership: By the Validity condition of Theorem 3,
honest nodes can make valid transactions with valid
received transactions as sources. Meanwhile, if another
node makes a transaction with sources that he is not the
receiver, by Theorem 1, the proof will be considered as
incorrect and the validation will fail.
• Fluidity: This condition is guaranteed by combining all
three conditions in Theorem 3.
• Validity: This condition directly follows from the Valid-
ity Condition in Theorem 3.
The insight of Theorem refth:vtl showing our system as a
valid VTL system is that our system does not guarantee BFT
for generic data and cannot be used in applications where
Assumption 1-3 do not hold. For example, valid transactions
cannot be validated by any other nodes if the sender refuses
to offer the proof to any other nodes. However, this scenario
is basically denying the value of the sender himself and thus
should not happen in the VTL model with UTXO structure if
the nodes are rational. On the other hand, if the transactions
are in the form of debits instead credits and the receiver is the
interested party, our system could guarantee neither the BFT
condition nor the conditions for a valid VTL system.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND SPONTANEOUS
SHARDING
In this section, we will give explanations for the scale-out
claim that we made for the throughput. First we show that the
throughput of our system is scalable even in the worst case
and will naturally scale out if the transaction pattern is already
sharded. Then, we explain why and how our system could
spontaneously shard. We give examples with theoretical and
simulative analysis to show that the feasibility of spontaneous
sharding as well as the scale-out throughput.
A. Communication Cost Per Transaction
In our system, the main chain is using PBFT with O(N2)
message complexity. However, the number of transactions
associated with one abstract in the main chain are arbitrary and
independent of the main chain. As a result, the communication
cost of the main chain can be made into a negligible term
in CCPT if we choose the number of transactions associated
with one abstract to be ω(N2). The duration of the consensus
process still plays an important role in the latency of our
system. However, note that the PBFT-based scheme is used
only for easy comprehension and can be easily replaced by
other scalable and low latency blockchain systems to improve
the latency.
Then, we make a few assumptions for easier analysis of
the CCPT. We assume that rational nodes will not care about
invalid transactions and thus will not try to re-collect the proof
of a transaction if it is failed for a number of times. In other
words, malicious nodes cannot spam invalid proofs to jam
the network. For the simplicity in analysis, we only consider
the resource limited network with Property 4. Then, in our
system, the CCPT can be represented by p/T , where p is the
total communication cost of all proofs and T the total number
of transactions made by the whole network.
In general, the proof of a transaction txi includes the chains
of the sender, the senders of all sources of this transaction,
and the senders of, recursively, the sources of the sources. In
most blockchain systems, the storage is traded for validation
efficiency, i.e., the validated transactions and their proofs
are stored and the proofs of new transactions are collected
incrementally. Then, in the worst case when the proof of any
transaction includes the chains of all nodes, if the storage
is not limited, all nodes simply need to be updated with all
transactions in the network. Each transaction will be commu-
nicated by O(1) message per each node due to Property 3 and
Lemma 1 since a point-to-point based collection is sufficient
to guarantee reliability and there is no need for BFT reliable
broadcast schemes. Then, for each node, the communication
cost for all its proofs is O(1)T . For the whole network,
p = O(1)NT and the CCPT is thus O(N).
A better case would be that the transaction pattern is
separated into shards and the nodes only make intra-shard
transactions. In that case, the proof of any transaction contains
the chains of only the nodes in their shards and the CCPT is
O(g), where g is the size of the shard. As a result, our system
achieves scale-out throughput.
B. Spontaneous Sharding
Here, we consider a more interesting case that the trans-
action pattern is not separated into small shards and show
that our system could still achieve scale-out throughput if all
nodes behave rationally. We call this spontaneous sharding.
The idea behind the spontaneous sharding is simple: rational
nodes will try to minimize their transmission and storage costs
by minimizing the proof size of each transaction as well as
the number of recorded transactions. Then, the minimum cost
of either transmitting or storing the transaction is actually the
cost of proving the authenticity of the value in the transaction,
which depends on the number of nodes that this value has been
passed through.
More precisely, let us focus on a piece of value originated
from a genesis block. For each time that it is transferred to a
node, a confirmed chain of that node is included in the proof
of the transaction of that value. Meanwhile, if the value is
used together with other sources to make transaction, then
these pieces of value are combined as well as their proofs.
Hence, rational node will always avoid combining values for
the sake of transmission and storage costs. Besides, the cost
can be reduced by trying to make each piece of value only
cycling in a small shard of the network, which makes the
proof of the value only contain the chains of the nodes in that
shard. Let us denote Pi for the set of chains that are included
in the proofs of all values owned by node i. By the analysis
made in Subsection IV-A, there is minimum overhead for proof
collection in our system and the communication cost for each
transaction per node is O(1) messages. Hence, the CCPT in
our system can be calculated as O(g), where g = E[|Pi|]. This
is called spontaneous sharding since the throughput increased
as if the network has been naturally sharded.
Here, we give a more detailed analysis with graph theory.
Let us consider the transaction pattern as a weighted directed
graph G(V , ~E), where the vertices v ∈ V represent the nodes
in the network. Then, instead of actually transactions, the
edges e = (u, v,w), e ∈ ~E represent the transaction channels
and their capacities, i.e., the existence of transactions between
the sender u and receiver v, and the rate for the transactions
(amount per second) denoted by w. Then, we assume a stable
and sustainable value-transfer network, where all nodes have
equal amount of income and outcome in a long term. Let us
denote the sets for inbound edges and outbound edges of node
i as Ii and Oi, respectively, i.e., Ii = {e ∈ ~E : e = (u, i,w)},
Oi = {e ∈ ~E : e = (i,u,w)}.
When a piece of value sent by node i via edge e =
(i,u,w) ∈ Oi to node u, this amount of value w should
return to node i through a path. The nodes on the path
form a node set, denoted by Ne ⊆ V . In our system, the
value will then return with all the chains of nodes in Ne.
The same holds for the values received from the edges in
Ii as each piece of these values will eventually return to the
corresponding inbound neighbor of node i. As a result, we
have Pi = {v ∈ Ne : e ∈ Ii ∪Oi}.
There are two ways to optimize Pi and achieve spontaneous
sharding: local optimization and global optimization.
A local optimization can straightforwardly be done by the
following: according to the information about the chains that
the receiver already has, the sender will choose from all its
unspent transactions for the ones with the least amount of
required proofs. For example, node 1 has transacted with
a receiver node 2 who has already acquired the chains of
{3, 4, 5, 6} in this round. Then, if node 1 has this information,
it will prefer to use the unspent transactions with proofs
that consist of the chains from {3, 4, 5, 6} for transactions to
node 2 so that it does not need to send proofs anymore. In
Appendix D, a naive smart transacting algorithm is given to
achieve local optimization.
A global effort could be made by letting all nodes broadcast
their acquired chains each consensus round. This effort is
spontaneous and beneficial to the nodes themselves, so a
reliable broadcasting scheme is not necessary. An additional
O(N2g) communication cost is required each round, which
adds at most O(g) to the CCPT. With the global information,
some optimization schemes could be run locally as references
for the source selection when nodes send transactions. The
purpose of the global optimization is to route all values with
the same sink through paths that include the minimum number
of nodes. A feasible global optimization scheme is a non-trivial
problem that we leave for future research.
However, the performance of the sharding and the eventu-
ally throughput depends heavily on the network model and
the transaction pattern. Here, we give theoretical analysis
showing the possibility of our system to scale-out in some
large random networks. Then, we use simulation to show
spontaneous sharding is feasible even in small networks.
Remark 2 (Tragedy of the Commons). It seems that the
spontaneous sharding would only happen if all nodes perform
rationally and cooperate, which will fall into the pitfall of
tragedy of the commons [32] if some nodes with high capacity
do not optimize their proof sizes. However, this system is not
identical to the tragedy of the common scenario since sponta-
neous sharding could also happen locally so that transmission
cost is a private resource rather than public resource. In other
words, a group of resource limited nodes can optimize their
transactions locally and reduces their transmission cost without
needing global cooperation.
C. Examples
Firstly, we show that our system with a global optimization
scheme will scale out in large random networks.
Example 1. We consider a random directed weighted graph
constructed as the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model with N nodes, M edges,
connectivity p = MN(N−1) , and p is larger than
lnN
N so that
the network is fully connected. We define f as the “weight
factor”, which is the average number of transaction channels
required for a piece of value, i.e., f = E[d wE[w]e]w. This value
is 1 in unweighted graph and is O(1) if w follows Poisson
distribution.
For Example 1, let us consider the average size of Pi. Firstly,
if our system is globally optimized, we will have
E[|Pi|] = E[|{v ∈ Ne : e ∈ Ii ∪Oi}| (1)
≤ E[
∑
e∈Ii∪Oi
|Ne|]. (2)
Hence we focus on one path in which the value from an
outbound edge e from node i flows back to i. The average
path length is denoted by l. Then, due to the limited capacity
of the edges, this value requires ∼ fl edges to be delivered.
Hence, there are ∼ fl nodes in the set Ne. Combining this
with (2) we have
E[
∑
e∈Ii∪Oi
|Ne|] (3)
∼ 2cfl (4)
∼ 2f · c lnN
ln pN
(5)
∼ 2f · c lnN
ln c
, (6)
where c is the average inbound (outbound) connectivity, which
equals to M/N = p(N − 1). Here, we have (4) since the
average number of elements in Ii∪Oi is 2c. Then, (5) follows
from the average path length l ∼ lnNln pN from the random
graph. Combining (6) with (2) and observing that 2f ·c lnNln c is
dominated by N when c = o( Nf lnN ), we have the following
condition: if conditions{
p > lnNN
p = o( 1f lnN )
(7)
hold, our system could scale out if a global optimization
scheme is used for spontaneous sharding, i.e., E[|Pi|] = o(N).
Here, f will be O(1) if the transaction rates between nodes
follow Poisson distribution. In that case, for instance, if
p = O( lnNN ) which suggests c = O(lnN), each node will
only need to acquire on average O( lnN ·lnNln lnN ) chains.
Then, we give an example showing that even without global
optimizations, a naive local optimization scheme could already
result in the reduction of acquired chains in a small network. In
order to show that the spontaneous sharding could be achieved
in the worst case, we artificially construct an extreme network.
Example 2. We consider N nodes {1, 2, . . . ,N} placed in a
ring and each node transacts to the next c nodes on its right and
receives from the next c nodes on its left. Each node is given an
initial amount of value and will uniformly at randomly make
transactions to the c nodes. The frequency and the amount
of the transaction follow Poisson and uniform distributions,
respectively.
We run a simulation with our system for N = 10, 15, 20, 25
nodes with difference connectivity c. We simulate the com-
munication between nodes with Netty3 and the main chain
with Tendermint [33]. We apply a naive smart transact-
ing algorithm in which the sender simply checks his own
transaction records for the information about the Pi of his
receivers and choose the sources accordingly. The implemen-
tation details and the source code of our system and the
simulation can be found in https://github.com/blockchain-lab/
ScaleOutDistributedLedger. Fig. 1 shows the scenarios of
sharding in stable states. It can be observed that when c is
small, we have g < N , meaning spontaneous sharding is
achieved. However, when c is equal to or larger than 3, 4, 4, 6
for 10, 15, 20, 25 nodes, respectively, all nodes would acquire
all chains. Then the throughput of our system is no better than
other scalable blockchain systems. It is due to the naiveness
of the algorithm that we use for local optimization, e.g.,
the current algorithm does not avoid combining sources with
different proofs into a single transactions and does not dis-
tinguish between chains received only once and chains being
continuously updated. With better optimization algorithms, we
believe that smaller g can be achieved for larger c.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a novel blockchain system for the
most considered type of distributed ledgers which we called
VTL model. In VTL model, we assume that nodes are rational
3http://netty.io/
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0 2 4 6
g
 
c 
N=10 N=15 N=20 N=25
Fig. 1. Average number of chains acquired by nodes for various connectivity
in stable states.
and will be motivated to prove their possessed value. Our
system has a very simple and fully decentralized structure that
does not introduce any node serving as “validator”. Our system
achieves uncompromised agreement and validity conditions
and could scale out by spontaneous sharding without sacrific-
ing security or decentralization. However, as the focus of this
paper is put on the formal theoretical introduction of VTL and
the off-chain and proof-based framework, many refinements in
practical perspective are left for future research.
• Checkpoints to improve storage efficiency: As sharding
is a spontaneous and gradual process that might requires
a initial phase, it might happened that nodes are required
to record the whole transaction set until sharding starts.
Then, the storage cost per transaction will not scale-out
and cost new nodes quite heavily to join. This problem
could be mitigated by introducing checkpoints in the main
chain, which verifies the validity of certain values so that
later on the proofs of these values do not have to date
back to the genesis blocks. However, this do requires
the newcomers to trust the old nodes who verified these
values.
• Private channels for low latency payments: Private
off-chain channels like [20] is complicated in traditional
blockchains since the notion of value is hinged to the
on-chain ledger. However, as in our system the value
is off-chain by nature, private channels for low latency
micro-payments can be easily designed.
• Supportive to conditional payments/smart contracts:
We conjecture that conditional payments and smart con-
tracts can also be supported by this system with modified
data structure and validation scheme as long as each
transaction includes some value transferred to at least one
of the receivers. Such system will simultaneously achieve
sharding on both communication/storage resources and
computation resources.
• Real-world Implementation: We conjecture that our
system will also scale-out in more practical networks
models [34], [35] or real-life transactions patterns [36],
[37]. Moreover, we believe that for most of the cryptocur-
rencies nowadays, our system will be very beneficial in
throughput since most of them are very “trader-centric”.
Then, for most users who only transact with traders, their
transmission and storage cost can be significantly saved
if the traders apply local optimization.
• Discrimination and hidden forks: As the proof size of
transaction can be very different, it might cause issues of
discrimination and hidden forks, e.g., values with huge
proof sizes are refused by some nodes in the network,
effectively causing a fork of the chain. This problem
can be partially solved if checkpoints are used. However,
we do not necessarily see this as a problem and argue
that this is no more dangerous than forks in traditional
blockchains.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof. We proof this theorem by contradiction. If there exists
a chain {B′u,1,B′u,2, . . . ,B′u,k′} which consists of confirmed
block and t′u,k,l 6= txi. First of all, confirmed blocks suggest
that all abstracts of {B′u,1,B′u,2, . . . ,B′u,k′} is on the main
chain. Then, since tu,k,l = txi is confirmed by an abstract
Au,k′ , all abstract of the chain {Bu,1,Bu,2, . . . ,Bu,k′} are also
on the main chain. Moreover, since the abstracts are signed
and the digital signatures are assumed to be unbreakable, the
chains {B′u,1,B′u,2, . . . ,B′u,k′} and {Bu,1,Bu,2, . . . ,Bu,k′}
will have the same set of abstracts of node u on the main chain,
which includes Au,k′ as the abstract of both B′u,k′ and Bu,k′ .
Since the hash function is assumed to be unbreakable, we
have B′u,k′ = Bu,k′ . Then, if t
′
u,k,l 6= txi, then we will have
B′u,k 6= Bu,k and B′u,k′ = Bu,k′ , k′ ≥ k, which contradicts
our assumption of the unbreakable hash function.
APPENDIX B
PROOF VERIFICATION ALGORITHM
Here we give the Proof Verification Algorithm as Algo-
rithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Proof Verification Algorithm Ver(P(txi)), txi ∈
Bu,k
#Verify the chain including this transaction
count← 0
absmark← 0
for Bsi,m,m = 1 : max do . Check the integrity of the
chain
if txi ∈ Bsi,m then count++
if m 6= 1 and first element in Bsi,m 6= H(Bsi,m−1)
then return fail
if Asi,m is included in the main chain then
absmark← m
if H(Bsi,m) /∈ As,m or Sigu(u, k,H(Bu,k)) is not
correct then return fail
if absmark < k then return fail
. Check the confirmation
if count 6= 1 then return fail
. Check the existence of the transaction
#Verify the chains of the sources
for all txj ∈ Sourcei do
if Ver(txj) 6= pass then return fail
return pass
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof. We first prove that if V(txi,P(txi)) = valid then txi is
valid. It directly follows from the four checks in Algorithm 1
since they are exactly the conditions in Definition 3.
We then show that if V(txi,P(txi)) 6= valid then txi is
not valid. To prove this, we first prove the statement “if
V(txi,P(txi)) 6= valid and ∀txj ∈ Sourcei,V(txj ,P(txj)) =
valid, then txi is not valid.”
We prove this statement by contradiction. Assuming that
there exists a transaction txk such that V(txk,P(txk)) 6= valid
but for all txj ∈ Sourcek,V(txj ,P(txj)) = valid, and txk is
valid.
By our algorithm, at least one of the four checks other than
the “Source Check” is failed. If the step “Proof Check”
fails, it suggests that a proof P(txi) does not exist, which
contradicts the assumption that txi is valid. If the step “Equal-
ity Check” fails, it contradicts the Value equality condition
of valid transaction. If the step “Double-Spending Check”
fails, it contradicts the No double spending condition of valid
transaction.
We then prove that if V(txi,P(txi)) 6= valid then txi is not
valid by contradiction. If this does not hold, then there must
exist a transaction that violates the statement proved above.
This transaction might be txi, the source of txi, or recursively
one in the sources of the sources.
APPENDIX D
SMART TRANSACTING ALGORITHMS
Here we give a naive smart transacting algorithms
Sourcei = ST(di, ai, Cu) in Algorithm 3 for rational nodes,
where node u intends to send an amount of ai to node di in
transaction txi and Cu is a collection of all transactions and
proofs recorded in node u. Here, we assume that nodes have
sufficiently large computation capability so that the compu-
tation cost is insignificant comparing to the communication
cost.
Algorithm 3 Non-interactive Smart Transacting Algorithm
Sourcei = ST(di, ai, Cu)
#Step 1: Check for all unspent transactions
UT← all unspent txi that are in C.
#Step 2: Determine the chains that d already has according
to C
Collected← ∅
for each txi in C and di = d do
chainsi ← {v|Bv ∈ P(txi) ∩ Cu} . All chains in the
proof of txi according to Cu
Collected← Collected ∪ chains(i)
#Step 3: Find the sources which has the least amount of
chains to send
for all Sourcen ⊂ UT such that the sum amount no less
than ai do
Proofn ← union of all P(txi), txi ∈ Sourcen
NChainsn ← {v|Bv ∈ Proofn}
ToCollectn ← NChainsn/Collected
return Sourcel where ToCollectl = min(|ToCollectn|)
Note that Algorithm 3 is a non-interactive algorithm. The
choice of the sources is much easier in an interactive fashion,
in which the receiver simply tells the sender the chains that
he already has once per round. Then, the second step in
Algorithm 3 can be omitted. The cost of this communication
is O(gc), where g is average number of chains that a node
acquires and c is the average number of transacting targets
of each node. This cost is no larger than O(gN) and adds
no more than O(g) cost to the CCPT for the same reason
that we have for global optimization in Subsection IV-B.
Both interactive and non-interactive algorithms will result in
spontaneous sharding. For a stable network with sufficient
transactions been made by each node, either interactive or
non-interactive schemes will have similar performance since
the transaction pattern is fixed and each node should already
have enough prior knowledge for the chains that each receiver
has.
